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No. 5761. In Bank. Jan.

1956.]

PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MABEL MA.LOTTE,
Appellant.
Privacy-What Constitutes Violation of Right.-When a person discusses the commission of a crime with another, face
to face or at a distance through the ·use of any means of
communication, there is no unreasonable invasion of privacy
when the other uses the conversation against him.
Telegraphs and Telephones-Crimes.-Where a conversation
was recorded by police officers at the moment it reached the
intended receiver, there was no interception within the meanof the Federal Communications Act, § 605, prohibiting
any person not authorized by the sender to intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted
communication to anyone.
Id.-Crimes.-There is no learning of the contents of a communication "fraudulently, clandestinely, or in any other unauthorized manner" in violation of Pen. Code, § 640, prohibiting tapping or an unauthorized connection with a
telegraph or telephone line, when one participant to the conversation consents to or directs its overhearing or preservation.
Criminal Law- Defenses- Entrapment.-Where an accused
had a preexisting criminal intent, the fact that when solicited
by a decoy he committed a crime raises no inference of unlawful entrapment.
Id.-Instruetions-Defenses-Entrapment.-Where there is a
complete absence of any evidence of unlawful entrapment, no
instruction on the subject need be given.
(1) Right of privacy, notes, 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 446; 14
A.L.R.2d 750. See also Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp, (1949 Rev.), Privacy,
§ 2; Am.Jur., Privacy, § 20 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, § 33 et seq.; Am.
Telegraphs and Telephones, § 65.
Entrapment to commit crime with view to punishment therefor, notes, 18 A.L.R. 146; 66 A.L.R. 478; 86 A.L.R. 263. See also
Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 200 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal Law,
§304.
McK. Dig. References: [1J Privacy, § 2; [2, 3] Telegraphs and
Telephones, §4; [4] Criminal Law, §50; [5] Criminal Law, §761;
9] Conspiracy, § 5; [7] Conspiracy, § 3; [8] Criminal Lf'V,
; [10} Municipal Corporations, § 237.

60

[46 C.2d

[6] Conspiracy-Criminal- Particular Conspiracies.-Defendant
was not improperly charged with a conspiracy to violate a
municipal police code section prohibiting an offer or agreement to commit an act of prostitution on the ground that she
could only be charged with a conspiracy to violate another
municipal police code section prohibiting one from soliciting
any person for the purpose of prostitution, since the two code
sections set forth separate offenses, the first making the offer
or agreement one's own, while the other relates to solicitation
for another.
[7] !d.-Criminal-Overt Act.-A conspirator does not have to
participate in the crime conspired.
[8] Criminal Law-Principals-Aiders and Abetters.-Conspiracy
is not synonymous with aiding or abetting or participating;
it implies an agreement to commit a crime, while to aid and
abet requires actual participation in the act constituting the
offense.
[9] Conspiracy-Criminal- Particular Conspiracies.-Pen. Code,
§ 182, occupies the field of conspiracy and prohibits a conspiracy "to commit any crime," and in prescribing the punishment for conspiracies to commit misdemeanors, no distinction
is drawn between misdemeanors defined by city ordinances
and those defined by statute.
[10] Municipal Corporations- Ordinances- Conflict With Statutes.-Although the Legislature can make exceptions to the
statutes enacted by it, inferior legislative bodies cannot.
( Const., art. XI, § 11.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco and from an order denying a new trial. John B. Molinari, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for conspiring to commit a misdemeanor and
for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Judgment
of conviction affirmed.
Leslie C. Gillen and John R. Golden for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond 1\1. 1\1omboisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Mabel lVIalotte appeals from a judgment
of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding her guilty of
conspiring to commit a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 182),
and of contributing to the delinquency of a minor (Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 702.) She also appeals from the order denying her motion for a new trial.
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On March 10, 1954, Frank Lombardi, at the request of
police, made a telephone call from the district attorney's
office in San Francisco. He identified himself and said,
listen Mabel; a friend of mine will be in town tonight,
he will call you. His name is Leonard ·windsor. Can
vou take care of him?'' 'I' his telephone call was not recorded
·
the officers present were unable to hear the party at the
other end of the line.
At about 8 o'clock that night Inspectors 0 'Haire and
:McGuire of the San Francisco Police Department went to
room 712 at the Sir I1~rancis Drake Hotel, where they had
previously registered. They placed a recording apparatus
under one of the beds and connected it to an induction coil,
a (1evice designed to overhear a telephone conversation withont the necessity of making physical connection with the telephone electrical circuit. Inspector 0 'Haire then placed a call
to Prospect 6-3267, and defendant answered. Their conversation was as follows:
''Hello.
''Is this Mrs. Malotte?
"Yes.
'' Uh-this is-uh-Ijeonard Windsor.
"Yes.
"Uh-Mr. Frank Lombardi told me to get in touch with
you this evening.
''Yes; he told me.
"He did?
"Yes.
"Well, I'm staying up at-uh-Sir Francis Drake, room
712.
''All right
"And-uh-I have my friend, Mr. Bacci.
"Uh-no, he didn't. But I'll-I'll take care of it. What's
the name, did you say?
''Bacci.
"All right. I'll-uh-what time do you want them, right
now?
"Well, not right at the moment. In about an hour, half
an hour, an hour.
"That'll be fine. All right, I'll take care of it.
''Yes, what time shall we expect them, in half an hour, an
hour?
''In about an hour will be fine.
''An hour?
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"Yes.
''All right.
"Okay.
''All right.
"Bye."
About an hour after the telephone call Yola Boles, a
minor, came to the hotel room and introduced herself as
Adele. The second girl failed to appear, and Yola gave the
officers another telephone number, which they called to ask
about the delay. Defendant also answered this call and told
them that the other girl would be along in a few minutes.
In the meantime, Mary Madsen, the other girl, thinking
she saw a plainclothesman following her, called defendant
for instructions. Defendant called the hotel room and asked
to speak to ''Adele,'' but was told that she was occupied.
Mary again called defendant, as she had been instructed
to do on her previous call, and was told that there was
nothing wrong and to go on up. Mary, however, refused to
enter the hotel unescorted. Defendant told her to call the
room and have the customer come down to meet her. Mary
called the room, asked 0 'Haire to come down, and asked him
to call defendant. 0 'Haire made the call and was told by
defendant, "Well, I have the girl on the other phone now
and she will meet you across the street in the Owl Drug
Store." None of these subsequent calls were recorded, nor
were they overheard by anyone except the parties thereto.
Inspector 0 'Haire met Mary at the Owl Drug Store and
returned with her to the room. The girls were paid $25
each. They disrobed and got into the beds. The officers
took badges from their luggage, identified themselves as officers, and placed the girls under arrest. Then they went to
defendant's apartment and waited outside overnight until
a warrant could be secured for her arrest. When they secured
the warrant, they demanded admittance, explained their
purpose, and forced the door when she refused to answer.
(See Pen. Code, § 844.) They found her hiding in the attic.
Defendant contends that the evidence of the recorded phone
call was inadmissible on the ground that it >vas obtained in
violation of her constitutional rights and in violation of
federal and California statutes. She maintains that without the interpretation the recorded call gives to the suhsequent transactions no conspiracy is established, leaving inadmissible the extrajudicial acts and declarations of the girls,
alleged coconspirators, and uncorroborated Mary's testimony,
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her
with defendant to serve as a
her.
general, relying on Olmstead v. United States,
438 [48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 66 .A.L.R. 376], and
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 [62 S.Ct. 993, 86
, contends that the overhearing of the telephone
by means of the induction coil was not a search
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
Constitution of the United States and article I, section
the California Constitution. It is unnecessary to dewhether those cases have been unsettled by Irvine
California, 347 U.S. 128 [74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561], for
is a basic difference between the conduct of the officers
in that case and the conduct of Inspectors 0 'Haire and
herein. In the Irvine case there were several trespasses when the microphone was installed and subsequently
moved in the Irvine home, and an "incredible" invasion of
the
to privacy through the eavesdropping over the
microphone. The officers monitored indiscriminately not only
the conversat1ons pertaining to gambling, but those involving
phase of the Irvine's personal affairs. The technique
used by the officers made selectivity impossible. In the present case there was neither trespass nor indiscriminate eavesUnlike the Irvine case, nothing was overheard
but the free discussion of a crime by one who thought her
listener a client. [1] When a person discusses the commission of a crime with another, face to face or at a distance
through the use of any means of communication, there is no
unreasonable invasion of privacy when the other uses the
conversation against him.
Defendant contends, however, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the Federal Communications Act ( 47
U.S.C.A. § 605), and section 640 of the California Penal Code
and that it was, therefore, inadmissible under the rule of
v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905].
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act provides:
". . . no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any comm1mication and divulge or publish the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning
of such intercepted communication to any person; . . . " A
majority of the federal courts define "intercept" as used in
section 605 to mean ''to take or seize by the way, or before
arrival at the destined place," and hold that there is no interwhen the intended receiver consents to or directs the
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the cmnmunication at the moment it reaches
States v. Y ce Ping J ong, 26 F.Supp. 69, 70;
United States v. Lewis, 87 P.Supp, 970, 973, reversed on
other grounds st~b nom. Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394;
United States v. Sullivan, 116 F.Supp. 480, 482; United States
v. Pierce, 124 P.Supp. 264, 267; and see dissent of Clark, J. to
Unit eel States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888, 891; cf. United
States v. Polakoff, supra, 112 F.2d 888, 889; United States v.
Stephenson, 121 F.Supp. 274, 277.) The United States Supreme Court, approving this definition in the Goldman case,
supm, 316 U. S. 129, 134, went on to say: "[Intercept] does
not ordinarily connote the obtaining of what is to be sent
before, or at the moment, it leaves the possession of the proposed sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes into the
possession of the intended receiver." (See Reitmeister v.
Reitrneister, 162 F.2d 691.) [2] Thus, as in the present
case, where the conversation was recorded by the officers ''at
the moment" it reached the "intended receiver," there was
no interception within the meaning of section 605 of the
Federal Communications .Act. [3] There was likewise no
invasion of privacy in violation of section 640 of the Penal
Code. 1 There is no learning of the contents of a communication "fraudulently, clandestinely, or in any other unauthorized manner'' when one of the participants to the conversation
consents to or directs its overhearing or preservation. (See
People v. Channel, 107 Cal..App.2d 192, 200 [236 P.2d 654].)
Defendant complains that the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. .A substantial part of the conversation between Frank Lombardi
and defendant, and all of that between Inspector 0 'Haire
and defendant is quoted above. Neither conversation, nor
any testimony brought out at the trial by defendant or the
People shows more than the creation of an opportunity for
defendant to act on her preexisting criminal intent.
[4] "Where an accused has a preexisting criminal intent,
1
" Every person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any other manner, willfully and fraudulently, or clandestinely taps, or makes any unauthorized connection with any telegraph
or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument under the control of any
telegraph or telephone company; or who willfully and fraudulently, or
clandestinely, or in any other unauthorized manner, reads, or attempts
to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or
communication while the same is in transit or passing over any telegraph or telephone wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or
received at any place within this State . . . , is punishable [by fine and
imprisonment.]''
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that vvhen solicited
a
he committed a crime
no inference of unlawful
'' (People v.
109 Cal.App.2d 450, 455 [240 P.2d 1024], quoted
with approval in People v. B1·addock, 41 Cal.2d 794, 802 [264
P.2d
.) [5] 'rhus, as in this case, where there is a
absence of any evidence of unlawful entrapment, no
on the subject need be given. (People v. Alamillo,
11::1 Cal.App.2d 617, 621 [248 P.2d 421]; People v. Jackson,
106 Cal.App.2d 114, 125 [234 P.2d 766] ; People v. Harris,
80 Cal.App. 328,331 [251 P. 823].)
[6] Defendant also contends that even if we admit the
to which she objects, the judgment must be reversed
on the ground that she was improperly charged with a conspiracy to violate section 240, subdivision (a), of the Police
Code of San Francisco. She claims that section 225 2 of the
Police Code defines the same offense as does section 240, 3 and
argues that since section 225 provides a lesser penalty, she
can
be charged with a conspiracy to violate that section.
The two sections set forth separate offenses. One can solicit
for another ( § 225), but the offer or agreement to commit an
act of prostitution is one's own.(§ 240, subd. (a).) [7] Defendant contends that if the sections are not the same, and
if section 240, subdivision (a), is construed as referring to an
act of prostitution to be committed by the one making the
offer or agreement, the evidence shows only a conspiracy to
violate section 225 and not section 240, subdivision (a), since
she did not offer or agree to commit an act of prostitution.
The answer to this contention is that a conspirator does not
haYe to participate in the crime conspired.
Finally, defendant contends that the felony charge was
improper and that she should have been sentenced and convicted for a misdemeanor only, on the ground that subsection
(g) of section 240 of the Police Code, which makes it a misdemeanor to aid or abet or participate in the doing of any of
the acts prohibited by section 240, should be construed as
prohibiting a conspiracy to violate section 240. [8] Conspiracy, however, is not synonymous with aiding or abetting
or participating. Conspiracy implies an agreement to commit
a crime; to aid and abet requires actual participation in the

l
,

2
" It shall be unlawful for any person on any public street or highway
or elsewhere, to solicit, by word, act, gesture, knock, sign or other·
wise, any person for the purpose of prostitution.''
""Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who: (a) Offers or agrees
to commit any lewd or indecent act or any act of prostitution;
''

we~
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aet
the offense
v. Bond, 13 Cal.App.
175 [109 P. 150].) [9] Moreover, section 182 of the Penal
Code occupies the field of conspiracy and
a conspiracy ''to commit any crime.'' In prescribing the punishment
for conspiracies to commit misdemeanors, no distinction is
drawn between misdemeanors defined by city ordinance and
those defined by statute. The case of In re Williamson, 43
Cal.2d 651 [276 P.2d 593], holding section 7030 of the Business and Professions Code, dealing with conspiracies to
violate certain licensing provisions of that code, to be an
exception to the general conspiracy provisions of section 182
of the Penal Code, is not in point, for section 240, subdivision
(g), of the Police Code of San Francisco cannot be considered
such an exception. [10] Although the Legislature can make
exceptions to the statutes enacted by it, inferior legislative
bodies cannot. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 11; Pipoly v. Benson,
20 Cal.2d 366, 370 l125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515], and cases
cited therein.) Thus, defendant was properly charged with
and convicted of a felony.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and :McComb, J., concurred.
CAR'rER, J.-I dissent.
I am of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed
for failure to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment.
There is evidence in the record which would support a verdict
based on that defense. The police officers induced Frank
Lombardi, a friend of defendant, to solicit her to commit the
criminal act here involved.
The police officer involved in the entrapment testified:
'' Q. You, either alone or with the assistance of someone
else conceived the idea of setting into motion a set of circumstances to cause someone to commit a crime, isn't that
correct ~ . . . A. Yes.''
After the solicitation by Lombardi the police officers posed
as decoys and made further solicitation of defendant which
culminated in the consummation of the crime. The jury could
have concluded that the police originated and set in motion a
scheme to cause defendant to commit a crime. This could be
interpreted to mean that regardless of the innocent or guilty
frame of mind of the victim, the police sought to cause her to
commit a crime. This purpose was carried out, the first step
being a telephone call by Lombardi to defendant asking her
to violate the law. In Cline v. Un,ited States, 20 F.2d 494,
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a narcotic for a dope addict upon the
of the latter whom he knew and who ·was acting
in fear of the police in making the solicitation. The court
held there was entrapment as a matter of law. ln Un£ted
Eman illfg. Co., 271 F. 353, the governmeut agent,
to be a customer for defendant's medicinal prod~
'' wrote to defendant asking it to send him
some. Defendant did so but misbranded the Sulfox which
a violation of the food and drug laws when the
1vas placed in interstate commerce. The court held
there was entrapment. In People v. Gallagher, 107 Cal.App.
425 [290 P. 504], the officers had Dall, an addict and seller
solicit defendant, an addict, to buy drugs. The
was left on the street, and, at Dall's request, defendant
for it and picked it up whereupon he was arreBted for
possession. The judgment of conviction was rPversed
for failure to instruct on entrapment, the court stating
429) : "It must be borne in mind that appellant was not
with having sold or bargained to sell any drugs ; nor
was any evidence whatever introduced to show that such was
his intention. The present case, therefore, is quite different
from those upon which respondent seems to rely, showing that
a defendant ·was already in the illeg·al possession of an article,
hut was entrapped into selling it. In the case at bar the
of appellant's defense was that the possession by him
of ~;aid drug was bronght about solely throngh the instrumentalities of the state's agent and those working under him,
for the very purpose of eausing his arrest. As said in the
case of In re illoore, 70 Cal.App. 483 [233 P. 805, 806], 'It
may be conceded that it would be violative of sound public
and repngnant to good morals to uphold the conviction
of person who, being entirely innocent of any intention to
commit a crime, was inveigled into its commission by an
officer of the law or by a private detective hired for that
purpose by some self-constitnted guardian of the public
morals. (People v. Barkdoll, 36 Cal.App. 25 [171 P. 440].)'"
views on entrapment were expressed in my dissent in
v. Bmddock, 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [264 P.2d 521].
For the foregoing reason I would reverse the judgment.

J., concnrred.
ppellant ':,; JH~titiou for a reheariug was denied Ii'ebruary
21, 1956. Carter, J., and Schauer, ,J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

